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Risk governance: Examining its Impact upon Bank Performance and Risk-Taking   
 
ABSTRACT As policy-makers in the United States contemplate a relaxation of financial regulation, our 
study contributes to this dialogue by testing the veracity of heightened standards of risk governance 
activities for US bank holding companies (BHCs). Our study examines evidence relating to the adoption 
of these standards by BHCs following regulatory intervention. We find that board-level risk appetite 
practices have a profound association upon BHC performance and tail risk. Our estimates show that 
BHCs which adopt risk appetite practices exhibit a significant improvement in headline performance 
and reduced tail risk measures. Our research is relevant to academics by identifying the significance of 
this risk governance practice which has been introduced by global regulators. For practitioners (including 
board members, risk managers, policy-makers and regulators), our study validates the efficacy of risk 
appetite frameworks as the future shape of financial regulation is being actively debated in the US.   
Keywords: Risk governance, risk appetite, BHCs, financial institutions, boards of directors, bank regulation 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ineffective oversight contributed to the financial crisis, that plagued the global economy from 2007 to 
2009.1 Excessive risk-taking was a leading cause of the financial crisis, resulting in significant costs 
(Conyon, Judge & Useem, 2011; Gao, Liao & Wang, 2013; Luttrell, Atkinson & Rosenblum, 2013). Since 
the financial crisis, global debt levels have increased by a sum of $70 trillion to $237 trillion (Bloomberg, 
2018), which includes government borrowings to fund bailouts. In the US, there were 387 bank failures 
over the three years ending 2011, up from 28 failures over the preceding three years (FDIC, 2018). 
Investors in certain banks saw the value of their holdings nearly destroyed (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). 
Beyond these economic costs, the social impact of financial crises is great, including a reduction in life 
expectancy, an increase in HIV-related health issues, a decline in the availability of education and 
increased poverty levels (van Dijk, 2013). The financial crisis was the most severe economic event in the 




Shortfalls in risk management are characterized by a failure to identify, measure, monitor and 
communicate risk exposures; it is the purview of top management and the board of directors to set the 
level and types of risks to be undertaken (Stulz, 2008). Improved corporate governance depends upon 
the board of directors and senior management to determine the firm’s risk appetite (Dermine, 2013; 
Basel, 2015). Risk profiles can be undertaken by managers and traders which may underweight low 
probability events that lead to tail risk related losses (Kashyap, Rajan & Stein, 2008; Ellul, 2015). Tail risk 
cannot be fully mitigated by external supervision or market discipline alone, given shortcomings in 
measurement systems and the level of opacity exhibited in financial institutions (Ellul, 2015). Banks that 
fail to embrace robust internal risk monitoring are at risk being exposed to greater tail risk levels (Ellul & 
Yerramilli, 2013).  Risk appetite is top management’s assessment of the expected effect upon the bank’s 
risk profile and valuation of taking on risky investments and activities (Stulz, 2015). Thus, risk appetite 
practices provide a framework for the board and senior management to improve internal monitoring 
activities in the post financial crisis environment (Gontarek & Bender, 2018). 
 
In the years following the financial crisis, policy attention shifted from capital and liquidity metrics to 
risk-taking oversight and conduct arenas (IMF, 2014; Basel, 2015; G30, 2015). Supervisors introduced 
enhanced risk governance measures to address perceived lapses in internal monitoring, including the 
adoption of risk appetite frameworks (Jackson, 2014; Yoost, 2014). We examine several risk governance 
features, including the board-level articulation of risk appetite, the role of the risk committee and the 
chief risk officer (CRO). Our study exploits a significant research gap, which is timely given the potential 
relaxation of bank regulation currently under discussion in the US. The results of our study can be 
summarised as follows: BHCs that adopt board-level approved risk appetite frameworks exhibit a robust 
positive association to a suite of performance measures and a negative relation to tail risk, when 
controlling for other performance and risk-taking determinants.2 Upon examination through the lens of 
agency theory, our study suggests that this practice is consistent with robust internal board-level 
monitoring activity, which augments direct external monitoring and market discipline as external 




The study makes several contributions to the understanding of risk governance.3 First, from a 
practitioner perspective, it disseminates evidence regarding the impact of risk appetite upon performance 
and risk-taking, relevant to bank directors and senior management given the demands to balance 
competing risk and return objectives. Next, for regulators, this research validates the adoption by BHCs 
of risk appetite practices as a robust internal monitoring tool. From an academic perspective, our study 
probes the literature on bank corporate governance and identifies a gap relating to risk appetite and BHC 
outcomes. It also provides evidence of a significant association between the adoption of risk appetite 
arrangements and an array of performance measures and tail risk. We assert that risk appetite has thus 
far received limited attention and should be considered as a potential explanatory variable in future 
empirical research.  
 
This article is structured as follows: Following the introduction, we describe the regulatory intervention, 
present a review of the literature and develop our hypotheses for testing. Afterwards, we discuss the data 
collected and methodology employed. We then examine the empirical relationship between risk 
governance mechanisms and a suite of outcome measures. Our conclusions follow presentation of the 
research findings. 
 
II. INTERVENTION  
Bank boards failed to exercise adequate oversight of risk-taking prior to the financial crisis. The de Larosière 
Report (2009) and Walker (2009) state that ineffective risk monitoring contributed to the severity of the 
crisis. Ellis, Haldane and Moshirian (2014) argue that the financial crisis unveiled bank governance failures 
at multiple levels, including ineffective bank risk monitoring. Weaknesses included the failure of board 





Following the financial crisis, policy-makers such as CEBs (2010), EBA (2011), IIF (2011) and the G30 
(2012) embraced heightened risk governance and proposed the adoption of risk appetite practices. Bank 
regulators followed with new requirements for risk appetite arrangements in Canada, Singapore, Europe, 
the UK and US (OSFI, 2013; MAS, 2013; CRD IV, 2014; BOE, 2015a and 2015b; Grant Thornton, 2014).5 
The Federal Register (2014a and 2014b) disseminated formal US risk governance guidance relating to the 
Dodd-Frank Act. These US standards impose significant new duties upon BHC boards of directors. US 
BHCs with assets of more than $50 billion are required to establish and monitor compliance to risk appetite 
frameworks at the board level (Federal Register, 2014a), establish a risk committee (with adequate levels of 
expertise), and ensure CRO independence and expertise levels (Federal Register, 2014b). 
 
The risk appetite statement is the articulation by the board of directors of the aggregate level and types of 
risk that the firm is willing to assume or avoid in order to achieve its business objectives (IIF, 2011; FSB, 
2013; Basel, 2015).6  The Basel (2015) guidance cites over 40 references to risk appetite, up from zero in its 
2006 version. The current Basel corporate governance guidelines were re-issued in part to emphasize the 
role of risk appetite at the risk committee level (Basel, 2015).  
 
Basel (2015) expects the responsibilities of the board of directors to include: 
§ Establishing (along with the CRO) the bank’s risk appetite taking into account its ability to manage 
risk effectively, 
§ Overseeing firm adherence to the risk appetite statement and risk limits,  
§ Monitoring the firm’s compensation approach and assess its alignment to its risk appetite, 
§ Ensure the risk appetite statement includes both qualitative and quantitative considerations, and 






The Senior Supervisors Group (SSG)7 sought to ensure a demonstrable improvement in articulating their 
risk appetite (SSG, 2010). In Europe, supervisors have indicated that banks face economic, financial, 
regulatory and other business headwinds, thereby underscoring the importance of an effective risk appetite 
framework as a means to mitigate excessive risk-taking (EBA, 2016). Consultants advise banks of the 
importance of risk appetite practices, arguing that it will lead to timely risk-aware decision-making, align 
resources, and facilitate satisfying performance management targets (Nestor, 2010; Oliver Wyman, 2013; 
Deloitte, 2014). The ECB (2016) recently performed an in-depth assessment of boards and their risk appetite 
frameworks for all significant financial institutions in Europe and found room for improvement remains, 
especially during the earlier stages of its adoption as well as inclusion of the interests of key stakeholders.  
 
Seminal conceptual studies posit that a well-governed bank identifies, measures and aggregates risk to ensure 
that its actual risk profile is consistent with its risk appetite; but taking-on no risk at all is not a realistic 
outcome (Stulz, 2015). Dermine (2013) argues that the board should protect the legitimate interests of all 
relevant stakeholders while establishing its risk appetite and tolerances. Effective articulation of risk appetite 
should lead to improved asset quality and bank performance levels (Alix, 2012; Jackson, 2014; Mollah & 
Liljeblom, 2016).  Surprisingly however, little empirical research has been disseminated to date regarding its 
impact upon BHC performance and risk-taking, exposing the research gap we seek to exploit. 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Risk Governance 
Practically speaking, a long-standing board-level responsibility is to provide effective internal monitoring 
(Fleischer, Hazard and Klipper, 1988; Macey & O’Hara, 2003; Claessens & Kodres, 2014; Macey & O’Hara, 
2016). Risk governance is a key internal monitoring activity of the board (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; 




Banks exhibit unique structural features from non-financial firms (Fama, 1980; Levine, 2004; Mülbert, 2010; 
Becht, Bolton and Roëll, 2011; Sarra, 2012; Laeven, 2013). Banks are highly leveraged compared to non-
financial entities, amplifying potential gains and losses and resulting in risk-shifting and potentially moral 
hazards (Bolton, 2010; Hopt, 2013; Laeven, 2013; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). Banks exhibit opaque risk 
profiles given the use of credit extensions, loan modifications and product level complexities, which present 
further portfolio monitoring challenges (Greenspan, 1996; Levine, 2004; Hopt, 2013; Grove & Cook, 2013; 
Hagendorff, 2014). As such, the true extent of their risk profiles may be difficult to discern by the directors, 
as well as creditors, shareholders and the rating agencies (Ellul, 2015).  
 
Competent and effective risk oversight by the board of directors is critical to balancing agency conflicts 
(John & Senbet, 1998; O’Sullivan and Kinsella, 2011). Thus, boards require effective processes to carry out 
their responsibility of internal monitoring over this risk and reward trade-offs (Ellul, 2015; Chen & Lin, 
2016; Gontarek & Bender, 2018). While being regulated, banks are also subject to satisfying shareholder 
performance expectations, underscoring the need for a framework to balance risk-related agency conflicts 
(de Andres & Valleldo, 2008; Maati & Maati-Sauvez, 2012). Deposit insurance may reduce incentives for 
effective monitoring (de Haan & Vlahu, 2015). Banks operate in fast moving capital markets, presenting 
oversight issues as risk profiles can change rapidly (Becht, Bolton & Roëll, 2011; Prager, 2013). These 
challenges complicate the role of the board, dictating a heightened duty of care in making informed and 
risk-aware decisions (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). Given these challenges, agency conflicts can have a 
pronounced impact upon the interests of all bank stakeholders inside and outside the firm (Dermine, 2013; 
de Haan & Vlahu, 2015).  
 
Make no mistake about it, banks take risks every day as part of their business model. They take credit, 
market, liquidity, business and operational risks, but the expected gains should ideally outweigh economic 
or reputational costs (Stulz, 2015). Good risk governance does not therefore eliminate all risks (Stulz, 2015). 
Rather, effective risk governance should lead the board to establish protective risk appetite boundaries and 
tolerance levels, which is communicated and respected across the firm. A well-governed bank must assess 
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value-maximizing trade-offs between risk and reward resulting in ex ante benefits to the firm, thus generating 
a positive net present value (Stulz, 2015). Banks should mitigate so-called bad risks that fail this standard 
(Stulz, 2015). In fact, risk appetite practices should identify both desirable and un-desirable risks for 
dissemination across the firm (Alix, 2012).   
 
Corporate governance mechanisms relate to bank risk-taking (Switzer & Wang, 2013; Ellul & Yerramilli, 
2013). Boards appear to have failed to appreciate the extent of risk-taking prior to the crisis. Many financial 
firms lacked adequate internal risk controls and risk reporting tools (Lang & Jagtiani, 2010).  Specifically, 
some boards failed to establish mechanisms to ensure effective articulation and monitoring of risk appetite 
(Sabato, 2009; United Nations, 2010; Kumar & Singh, 2013). Policy-makers observe that banks that correctly 
balanced risk appetite to their risk management capabilities avoided costly unexpected losses in the crisis 
(SSG, 2008). Unfortunately, the articulation of risk appetite was not always seen as an essential core 
responsibility of the board (Charkham, 2003; Moody’s, 2005; Prager, 2013). Bank boards suffered from a 
lack of consensus and information quality on risk appetite during the financial crisis (Nestor, 2010; Pirson 
& Turnbull, 2011).   
 
The failure of HBOS Plc in the UK provides a case-in-point of the inadequate articulation and monitoring 
of risk appetite. The HBOS board failed to implement an effective risk appetite framework (BOE, 2015c). 
Each HBOS division was responsible for setting its own risk appetite, but no group-wide risk appetite was 
established until 2007, by which time the crisis was fast approaching. The board gave insufficient priority to 
risk management, failed to develop and embed risk appetite with quantitative risk targets, and failed to 
articulate responsibility for setting and monitoring risk appetite in its Board Control Manual (BOE, 2015c). 
HBOS failed to monitor risk-taking through a single group-wide committee. Notably, the corporate loan 
division carried £9 billion of credit exposure essentially outside its risk appetite (BOE, 2015c). All of this 
evidence points to a weak risk governance environment at HBOS. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
implementation of the HBOS group-wide risk appetite statement during the 2010–2014 business planning 
process was “too little and, proved, much too late” (McConnell, 2016).  
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In another notable vignette, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011) chronicles one occasion at Merrill 
Lynch in 2007 when business-line executives reported upwards to the board for the first time about a 
material $32 billion build-up of sub-prime credit exposure. This was an obvious case of the board failing to 
establish, monitor and cascade downwards a clear risk appetite boundary over its trading division and 
receiving timely reporting of risk exposure, resulting in a significant impact to the firm’s performance. If it 
is the responsibility of the firm’s board and senior management to fully understand the bank’s risk profile 
(Basel, 2006), then these two examples show the failures of effective internal risk monitoring and the 
potential for the build-up of so-called tail risks, at that time. 
 
A maturation of risk appetite practice has since occurred. The OCC today requires risk appetite 
arrangements to be specifically articulated and monitored by the boards of covered US BHCs (Federal 
Register, 2014a). Moreover, the board of directors must actively oversee its risk-taking activities and hold 
management accountable for adhering to the risk appetite framework. It must challenge, or when necessary, 
oppose, management decisions that might cause excessive and imprudent risk-taking. Banks are placing 
increasing emphasis on risk governance processes as a means of preventing the build-up of excessive risk 
profiles to reduce downside risks and risk appetite arrangements are at the centre of this shift in bank 
behaviour (Jackson, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2015). Risk appetite is taking a prominent place in the suite of 
risk governance mechanisms of financial institutions (Alix, 2014; Gontarek, 2016). Risk appetite frameworks 
must be aligned with staff compensation and remuneration schemes, as one simple means to facilitate a 
robust risk culture across the firm (ECB, 2018). Best practices for risk appetite focus on linking risk appetite 
with performance assessment and advancement and compensation (Yoost, 2014). 
 
Risk appetite practices holds promise to facilitate risk identification for the firm’s board and c-suite 
executives which are outside of its capacity to safely manage risk. Conceptual literature argues that effective 
risk appetite arrangements ensure that acceptable risks are undertaken, aligning resources with profitable 
investment and investment decisions, to a achieve a positive impact upon performance (Sabato, 2009; 




The use of risk appetite, when combined with a strong risk culture, infrastructure and incentives, can lead 
to improved firm performance (Alix, 2012; G30, 2015). In summary, a bank’s risk appetite is an assessment 
by top management of the expected effect of the bank’s risk-taking and the value of the trade-off of 
undertaking riskier investments and activities (Stulz, 2015).   
 
Tail-risk has been defined as a rare outcome that can have a devastating effect upon a bank’s balance sheet 
(Kashyap, Rajan & Stein, 2008; Ellul, 2015). Without robust internal monitoring, decision-making processes 
relating to these risk-return trade-offs may be entangled in corporate politics, the source of several large 
notable risk management failures (Ellul, 2015). Examples include the Merrill Lynch vignette noted above 
and events at UBS in 2008. Ivantsov (2016) defines the tail risk related event at UBS for example as an 
extreme cliff risk directly impacting performance when crystallised, with sub-prime and related super-senior 
related losses of over $35 billion between 2007 and early 2008.  
 
Tail risks may be curtailed by robust internal monitoring activities (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). Tail risks may 
occur when superficial risk management practices fail to identify and mitigate low-probability outcomes that 
later turn out to be significant to the firm’s risk profile . Tail risks cannot be fully contained by supervision 
or market discipline alone, given risk measurement challenges, strong incentives, and product-level 
complexities which obscure the true nature of risk-taking and value creation (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013).  Tisk 
appetite as an internal risk governance mechanism may contribute to the containment of tail risks which 
otherwise may go on un-monitored by external monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Sabato (2009) explains that firms articulate their risk appetite (desired risk profile) and risk capacity 
(maximum tolerance for risk-taking) by linking concentration limits, economic capital levels, and the 
cascading and embedding of risk appetite effectively within the business unit. Boards should be composed 
of directors who are capable of acquiring and processing information to effectively assess major risks and  
adjudicate the correct level of risk appetite (Mülbert, 2010; Wymeersch, 2012; Lam & Potter, 2012; Ellul, 
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2015). Validating risk appetite is vital to the corporate governance framework of financial institutions and 
cascading it to the business line facilitates consistent risk-based decision-making (Davies, 2013; Lam, 2014; 
McConnell, 2016). Ellul (2015) explains that excessive risk-taking can destroy value when a bank’s actual 
risk profile departs its optimal targeted level of risk-taking.  
 
Bank Director (2016) provides a glimpse into the current use of risk appetite practices, reflecting the 
regulatory shift towards this risk governance activity. According to this report, 94 per cent of firms with 
assets greater than $10 billion confirm that establishing risk appetite is a key responsibility of the board risk 
committee. It also reports that 67% of banks with assets greater than $1 billion communicate the risk 
appetite framework to all employees. Risk appetite arrangements are now emerging as a key risk governance 
practice (Oliver Wyman, 2013; Yoost, 2014; CRO Forum, 2015).  However, until now, little or no empirical 
evidence exists to assess the veracity of risk appetite frameworks as an risk governance practice. 
 
Beyond risk appetite practices, risk governance includes the role and experience level of the board-level risk 
committee.8 In the US, covered BHCs (as well as publicly-traded BHCs with assets of more than $10 billion), 
must establish and maintain standalone risk committees to oversee risk management (Federal Register, 
2014b). The risk committee, which considers forward-looking risk-based issues, should be distinct from the 
audit committee. Deloitte (2017) reports that 100% of larger US banks now have a dedicated risk committee 
separate from its audit committee, up from 85% in 2014. Walker (2009) reports that fundamental issues 
considered by the risk committee should include prudential risks, such as leverage and capital, liquidity, 
market, operational (including technology and cyber risks), and business risks (i.e., reputational/brand, 
conduct and ethical risks). Yeh, Chung & Liu (2011) find that financial institutions that exhibit greater 
degrees of independence within the risk committee performed better in the financial crisis.   
 
Board-level risk committee members increasingly interface with supervisors on detailed risk-related issues 
facing the firm across the credit, market and operating risk spectrum. The Federal Reserve evaluates 
directors on their ability to identify, measure and control risk (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). Risk committee 
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chairmen ideally should exhibit a mastery of the subject matter of their committees in order to foster debate 
and shape committee risk-taking decision-making (Carrott, 2013). The heightened risk governance standards 
in the US also require covered BHCs to ensure that the risk committee has at least one member with risk 
expertise in identifying, assessing, and managing risk exposures (Federal Register, 2014b, p. 17286).  
 
Boards with strong risk committees may be less likely to undertake excessive risk-taking (McNulty, Florackis 
& Ormrod, 2013). Independent directors on risk committees stand in a better position to challenge 
managerial power and mitigate agency conflicts (Yeh, Chung & Liu, 2011). Little empirical research has been 
disseminated regarding bank risk committee size, a proxy for influence and effectiveness. Battaglia and Gallo 
(2015) find a positive relation for risk committee size and performance for Asian banks while Al-Haidi, 
Hasan & Habib (2015) find a positive relationship between larger risk committee size and levels of market 
disclosure. This indicates a further gap in the literature for empirical examination.  
 
Thus far, there is limited evidence if any that the existence of a risk committee drives performance (Aebi, 
Sabato & Schmid, 2012; Hines & Peters, 2015). In fact, the latter authors posit that risk management 
committees may represent a symbolic governance practice to enhance the firm’s reputational legitimacy 
(Hines and Peters, 2015, p. 288).  
 
The existing evidence presented within related literature examining directors’ risk expertise levels is mixed. 
On the one hand, Fernandes and Fich (2013) find that the presence of experienced directors is associated 
with reduced risk exposure prior to the crisis, greater stock returns and lower TARP funding. Hau and 
Thum’s (2009) examination of the demographic details of supervisory board members reveals that 
competence levels relate positively to performance. Iselin (2016) finds that risk committees provide effective 
stewardship of bank capital, as BHCs with risk committees are associated with greater capital levels during 




However, other research challenges these positions. Findings presented by Andries and Brown (2014) report 
that greater expertise on bank boards is associated with rapid pre-crisis credit growth and greater credit 
contraction after the crisis. Seminal research by Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) examine US BHCs 
and find that independent directors’ expertise is strongly associated with greater risk-taking and lower BHC 
performance during the crisis period.   
 
Risk committee charters describe and delineate the roles, responsibilities, objectives and qualifications of its 
members (Chapman and Cutler, 2016). Risk committee charters should specifically include approval of the 
risk appetite statement and its articulation across the business (Deloittes, 2014, 2016). One study reports 
that 86 per cent of the board-level risk committees of large US banks have developed risk committee 
charters (Deloitte, 2016), providing a glimpse into the risk governance activities of the board including 
monitoring processes of risk-taking. 
 
Beyond risk appetite activities and the risk committee, the role of the CRO is an important actor in risk 
governance structures (Mikes, 2008, 2010; Gontarek, 2016). CRO experience and independence is 
considered important to the regulator, given the requirement in the US for each BHC to be satisfied that 
the CRO possess the relevant experience for a BHC of commensurate size, structure, risk profile, 
complexity, activities and size (Federal Register, 2014a). The CRO may report to the chief executive officer 
(CEO) and/or board risk committee (Walker, 2009) and will typically enjoy direct access and risk reporting 
to board’s risk committee without impediment (ECB, 2016).  In seminal research, Aebi, Sabato and Schmid 
(2012) find that BHCs where the CRO reports directly to the board of directors (and not to the CEO) 
exhibit higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. Lingel & Sheedy (2012) evaluate 
risk governance features in an international sample and find that the CRO’s presence on the executive team 
and compensation are important determinants for risk-taking behaviours (along with board-level risk 
committee characteristics). In one review of risk committee charters, it is noted that the risk committee 
must approve the appointment or dismissal of the CRO as well as remuneration levels in 73% of large US 
banks, up from 46% in 2014 (Deloittes, 2016). 
 
13 
Other Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Other board characteristics may explain the relationship with BHC performance and/or risk-taking. Board 
size has an ambiguous relation with performance. Larger forums face communication and co-ordination 
challenges, strengthening the hand of management (Jensen, 1993). Some research suggests that larger boards 
are associated with improved performance as more directors contribute to monitoring of the firm (Adams 
& Mehran, 2012) while other research suggests it is associated with greater risk-taking (IMF, 2014). Notable 
studies find a complex relation between board size and performance, where larger boards improve 
performance to a certain extent before tapering off in an inverted U shape function (de Andres & Valleldo, 
2008).  
 
Mamatzakis & Bermpei (2015) find that investment bank board size is robustly and negatively related to 
bank performance, supporting the agency-costs hypothesis with this sample. Aebi, Sabato & Schmid (2012) 
posit that board size, as a corporate governance mechanism, may be substituted by external monitoring, 
possibly explaining the variety of findings in the literature.  
 
The extent of board level meetings (Vafeas, 1999), including board-level meeting frequency (Hahn & Lasfer, 
2016) may demonstrate a level of internal monitoring and strong corporate governance in the banking 
industry although greater meetings may also denote the need for greater oversight given under-performance, 
or so-called re-active boards (Vafeas, 1999; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008).  
 
Another aspect of board structure is the proportion of non-inside directors as they can mitigate agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that external directors may 
have reputational motivations, and thus exercise diligent internal monitoring. Director independence has 
been potentially linked to greater protection of creditor interests and thus may serve as a brake on excessive 
risk-taking (Vallascas, Mollah & Keasey, 2017). Some studies find that non-insider board member 
representation is largely unrelated to risk-taking or performance (IMF, 2014; Grove et al., 2011), whereas 
others observe greater director independence is associated with lower risk-taking (Switzer & Wang, 2013). 
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Some literature finds independent directors potentially detrimental to the interests of shareholders, as 
further equity was raised in the crisis resulting in wealth transfers between owners and creditors (Erkens, 
Hung & Matos, 2012). The evidence remains ambiguous thus far on non-inside directors.  
 
The level and power of institutional shareholders may impact outcomes. Institutional shareholders can have 
the power, influence and incentives to monitor risk-taking and performance in banks (Laeven & Levine, 
2009; Gropp and Köhler, 2010; Berger et al., 2015) or alternatively drive greater risk-taking possibly resulting 
in greater losses over time (Aebi, Sabato & Schmid, 2012). This latter position resonates with Erkens, Hung 
& Matos (2012) who found greater board level independence pre-crisis was related to greater BHC risk-
taking. 
 
Age and experience may be related characteristics in the context of financial performance and risk-taking. 
Citing upper echelons theory, Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that executive characteristics make a 
difference to the quality of decision-making and thus performance. Mikels and Reed (2009) study the role 
played by age in financial decision-making and establish a greater risk-taking capacity in younger adults, 
whereas mature adults have more experience in complex decision-making (Worthy et al., 2011). Nguyen, 
Hagendorff and Eshraghi (2015) catering for executive age in their study of US banks. They conclude that 
younger executives may have greater incentives to engage in riskier and value-destroying activities, incurring 
greater agency-related rents. Grove et al., (2011) measure the age of board directors and find that older 
directors are positive for performance to a point after which the benefits taper-off. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
In our study, the null hypothesis is that adoption of risk appetite practices has a positive impact on BHC 
performance measures. With respect to risk-taking and inspired by Ellul & Yerramilli (2013), we also 
hypothesize that risk governance, and specifically in this case risk appetite practices, should have a negative 
relation with tail risk, all else equal. This risk governance practice is a clear feature of robust risk management 
and internal monitoring - a framework to identify risks and take corrective actions as needed at the most 
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senior levels of the firm as risk and return trade-offs are assessed. Tail risks respond to robust risk 
governance and internal monitoring activities, which may not be fully captured by the regulator’s oversight 
and external market discipline (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013; Ellul, 2015). As such, tail risk is our primary risk 
measure. The alternative hypothesis is that risk appetite arrangements are window-dressing and largely 
ceremonial practices adopted by banks in response to regulatory fiat, thus having no discernible impact at 
all upon BHC outcomes. 
 
IV. Data and Variables  
 
Data 
Since the data collected includes a combination of both time-series and cross-sectional data, panel data 
analysis is employed as an efficient empirical tool (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Time dummies are used 
to control for yearly effects. The following equation is estimated where the BHC outcome may be 
performance or risk-taking outcomes: 
 
Equation 1:  
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Where	Performanceef ∈ {ROA, ROE, Other	Operating	Income,Holding	Period	Returns	(HPRs)} 
	




In the above equation, the subscript i denotes the BHC and t denotes the year of the observation.  This 
model allows us to control for important corporate governance and BHC business model characteristics 
that may affect BHC performance or risk-taking outcomes.   
 
Sample Selection 
The chosen sample consists of 140 large US BHCs, for the period 2012 to 2015.9 This sample covers a 
significant proportion of the US banking system with over $11 trillion or 70% of total US banking system 
assets. The Federal Reserve’s website of the largest BHCs was used to identify the sample BHCs, and 
BoardEx was used to remove intermediate holding companies (IHCs) which are not applicable to this study 
as foreign owned subsidiaries. The largest BHCs are subject to the suite of risk governance changes, while 
smaller BHCs may or may not implement these arrangements notwithstanding the lack of formal 
requirement. The sample comprised 560 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2012 to 2015. The full 
list of BHCs within in the sample is found in Appendix I. 
 
Risk & Corporate Governance Variables 
The corporate governance variables relate to the strength of the internal monitoring function. Our key risk 
governance variable is the activity of establishing and articulating the risk appetite statement at the board-
level risk committee. Data on the articulation of risk appetite by the board are collected from individual risk 
committee charters retrieved from BHC websites and on-line10. For each BHC, the unambiguous existence 
of board-approved risk appetite statement approved by the board and/or its risk committee is coded as 1 
(exists) or 0 (does not exist) for each year in the study. 
 
We examine the size of the risk committee as an explanatory variable (de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; 
Battaglia, Curcio & Gallo, 2014; Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). As this study focuses on risk governance and the 
role it may play in performance and risk-taking, the role of the risk committee is considered (Iselin, 2016; 
Chapman and Cutler, 2016). The size of the risk committee can serve as a proxy for willingness to invest in 
board-level resources, a sign of influence and stature, and thus represent greater governance (Hines et al., 
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2015). The number of risk committee members is used in our study, following Tao & Hutchinson (2013) 
and Hines et al. (2015).  We collect this information from BoardEx.  
 
In the US, CROs of large BHCs are required to have relevant experience in identifying, assessing, and 
managing exposures of large complex financial institutions (Federal Register, 2014). Berger, Kick and 
Schaeck (2014) examine demographic features of executives and bank risk-taking (including age) as an 
effective substitute for workforce experience. They find that younger management teams significantly 
increase bank portfolio risk and that risk profiles decline with advanced age of executives. The age of senior 
executives is used as an explanatory variable in banking studies such as Grove et al. (2011) and Cooper & 
Uzun (2012).  Older c-suite executives in banks are related to lower levels of risk-taking (Switzer & Wang, 
2013). We use CRO age as a proxy to estimate the level of experience and maturity of the CRO as a key risk 
governance actor and collect this data from Bloomberg. 
 
McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod (2013) argue that high effort norms by directors lead to lower risk-taking. 
Board meeting frequency reflects the degree of monitoring efforts (Hahn and Lasfer, 2016). Attending board 
meetings is one of the basic standards to meet US bank director diligence requirements (Adams and Ferreira, 
2012; Chou, Chung, & Yin, 2013). Board meetings are a means to assess internal monitoring efforts 
(Aggarwal and Williamson, 2006). We measure this variable as the number of meetings attended as a 
percentage of total meetings held per annum, following Battaglia and Gallo (2016) and Aebi, Sabato and 
Schmid (2012).  We collect this data via Bloomberg. 
 
The ratio of non-inside directors to total directors is an often-used explanatory variable in bank corporate 
governance studies (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, 2011; Battaglia & Gallo, 2016). Non-inside directors 
have no employment relationship with the company except for their board seat. This data is collected via 
BoardEx. We also collect the level of involvement by institutional shareholders as a control variable 
following Aebi, Sabato & Schmid (2012), Switzer & Wang (2013) and Berger et al., (2015). Institutional 
shareholders may have the power, influence, incentives and access to monitor or drive bank risk-taking and 
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thus performance (Laeven and Levine, 2009).  We collect the ratio of institutional ownership shareholdings 
to total shareholdings from Bloomberg. 
 
Bank Level Variables 
In our regressions, we control for various bank level characteristics that may explain bank performance or 
risk-taking, including BHC size (Demsetz, Saidenberg & Straham, 1997; Chen et al., 2011; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011; Switzer and Wang, 2013). BHC year-end total assets are collected from the US Federal 
Reserve Board and its log value is employed in our estimations. BHC size is associated with growth, scale 
and business strategies (Iqbal, Strobl and Vähämaa, 2015). For example, BHC asset size is statistically related 
to the number of BHC subsidiaries (Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery, 2012), suggesting that oversight of 
larger organisations may be more complex than smaller firms. 
 
Controlling for BHC business model differences are taken into account with the BHC size as noted above 
but also by examining traditional bank characteristics including the significance of loans on the asset side 
and deposit funding on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. Total loans to total assets follows Kupiec & 
Lee (2012); Minton, Taillard & Williamson (2014); and Battaglia & Gallo (2016) and is used to capture the 
relative impact of these business model drivers.  Banks with fewer loans (and a greater extent of non-lending 
businesses such as transaction banking, sales and trading, custody or payments, advisory and investment 
banking) may exhibit different performance or risk profiles than a bank heavily centred on the provision of 
credit products to its clients primarily.  
 
Deposits to total assets (deposits) is collected following Aebi, Sabato & Schmid (2012) and Ellul & Yerramilli 
(2013). These variables control for balance sheet composition and profitability (ECB, 2010b; Ellul & 
Yerramilli, 2013). Banks that attract deposits with relative ease may perform better, notably during 
challenging funding market conditions (Dermine & Schoenmaker, 2010; Hoque, 2013). We collect both of 




The extent of BHC international activity may be a determinant in risk-taking levels. Monitoring overseas 
operations may exacerbate agency problems (Lee & Kwok, 1988). Rather than benefiting from the 
diversification of clients within new geographies, evidence shows that US banks with international activities 
have higher risk profiles and lower lending standards (including weaker loan covenants) than purely 
domestic banks (Berger et al., 2015). In essence, this suggests that additional international market risks 
outweigh any benefit of international diversification. We collect the percent of international activities of 
BHC total income from Bloomberg.    
 
Outcome (Dependent) Variables    
Bank performance provides a yardstick for relative value judgments of commercial banks and their success. 
Performance and risk measures are examined herein through a suite of headline outcome variables. Return 
on assets (ROA) is used as an accounting-based BHC outcome variable (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; ECB, 
2010a; Xu, Grove and Schaberl, 2013; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; Battalgia and Gallo, 2015). ROA is 
defined as the cumulative annual net income for each year divided by that year’s total assets. Return on 
equity (ROE) is also used often as a bank performance metric in empirical research; it takes into account 
the equity capital deployed to generate returns. Palvia (2011) calls ROE a standard measure of bank 
accounting performance. We use ROE following Aebi, Sabato & Schmid (2012); McNulty & Akhighbe 
(2017); and Elyasiani & Zhang (2015). Both variables are collected from Bloomberg. 
 
Copeland (2012) and Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery (2012) report that larger BHCs generate significant 
non-traditional income streams which results in greater organizational complexity and arguably well covered 
by risk governance processes including risk appetite frameworks. Other operating income is employed 
within our estimations as a dependent variable to reflect those underlying volatile sales and trading or 
investment banking revenue channels which may be underpinning the headline performance measures. 
These studies generally conclude that income streams associated with non-conventional business lines tend 
to be more volatile than interest-based activities and may be relevant to larger covered BHCs in our study. 
Other operating income is calculated as other operating income divided by total assets and all data is 
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collected from Bloomberg. Finally, we turn to stock holding period returns (HPRs) as a market-based 
performance measure following Beltratti & Stulz (2011); Aebi, Sabato & Schmid (2012); and Peni & 
Vahämaa (2012). HPRs are collected from Bloomberg.   
 
We collect risk-based outcome variables for our estimations, including loan loss provisions (LLPs). LLPs 
are measured as the loan loss provision divided by total assets and is collected via Bloomberg. LLPs has 
been previously examined in the literature (Kanagartnam & Lobo, 2003) as a source of reserves for potential 
future bad debts that may later become uncollected. Positive values (an increase in LLPs) may also reflect a 
form of income smoothing, thus a sign of effective corporate governance practice (Fonseca & González, 
2007; Zagorchev & Gao, 2015).  
 
Next, we calculate the z-score in our estimations as a risk outcome for each BHC.11 The z-score is inversely 
related to the probability of bank insolvency (Roy, 1952). We choose the bank z-score as it predicts bank 
failure with a high accuracy and is highly correlated with the Merton (1974) distance-to-default measure, 
another widely used bank risk measure in the literature. Beltratti & Stulz (2011), Belghitar & Clark (2012), 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (2011), Bai & Elyasiani (2013) and Berger et al. (2015) use the z-score as a risk 
measure in a related context. A higher z-score indicates higher profitability levels to cover debt expenses 
and thus a more stable financial institution. We follow Laeven & Levine (2009) and define the z-score as 
the sum of the mean value of the annual ROA plus the mean value of the capital asset ratio or “CAR”, 
divided by the standard deviation of annual ROA for over each of the preceding four years. The z-score is 
described further below: 
 
Equation 2:  
 







Next, following Ellul & Yerramilli (2013) and Battaglia & Gallo (2016), we calculate BHC tail risk. BHC tail 
risk is the negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock over the 5% worst return days. Tail risk data 
is collected from Bloomberg. BHCs with an independent and effective risk management function should 
have lower enterprise-wide tail risk, all else equal (Rajan, 2005, Kashyap, Rajan & Stein, 2008). The need to 
mitigate tail risk rises from agency related pressures leading to excessive risk-taking by executives or traders 
combined with the limitations of regulatory supervision and external (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). Tail risk is 
that rare outcome that has the potential to have a devastating effect when it materialises (Ellul, 2015). This 
is precisely when effective internal monitoring activities become crucial to a bank’s overall risk profile.  
  
In summary, our suite of dependent variables includes performance measures ROA, ROE, other operating 
income and HPRs while the risk outcome variables include LLPs, the z-score and tail risk. Our suite of 
dependent variables includes both accounting and market determined measures. All variables are also 
defined in Appendix 2. 
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
  
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our measure of BHC performance and risk-taking, the corporate 
governance and risk governance variables and business level control variables. Mean annual ROA 
performance for the sample period was 1.02% in our study. This compares with a mean ROA of 1.10 per 
cent reported by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and 1.20 per cent by Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014). 
The mean value of ROE in our study is 9.09% versus 12.6% in Switzer & Wang (2013) and 8.43% in Aebi, 
Sabato & Schmid (2012). As expected, BHC holding period returns performed well during the recovery 
period post financial crisis with a mean 20.68% annual return, buoyed by policy intervention post financial 
crisis. By contrast, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) report a negative 7 per cent mean annual return for the period 




Table 1 also reports the suite of risk-related variables, including the average level of loan loss provisions of 
0.20% (versus 0.72% in Zagorchev & Gao’s (2015) sample which included the crisis period).  The mean 
value of tail risk is -27.56% versus 4.7% which included the crisis period in Ellul & Yerramilli (2013).  The 
z-score value is 10.61, versus 8.81 in Garcia-Sánchez et al. (2017), and 7.40 in Berger et al. (2015). 
 
Risk appetite arrangements are published and articulated by an average of nearly 27% of BHCs in the sample, 
having increased from 15% in 2012 to 42% by 2015. The mean number of risk committee members is 5.0, 
versus 3.9 reported in Battaglia & Gallo (2015) and 4.91 in Hines et al. (2015). The average age of the CRO 
in our study is 54.9 years, compared to 49.2 years for the CFO in Switzer & Wang (2013).  Coles, Daniel & 
Naveen 2008 report CEO age levels of 55.3 years whereas Pathan & Skully (2010) reports 56.9 years. In our 
study, each BHC has on average 86% of non-insider directors, versus 72% in Elyasiani & Zhang (2015) and 
79% in de Andres & Vallelado (2008). A mean value of 10.1 board meetings is observed across our sample, 
versus Adams & Mehran’s (2012) 8.4 board meetings, 10.4 observed in Battagia, Curcio & Gallo (2013) and 
10.48 observed in Grove et al. (2011). 
 
In terms of BHC business level variables, the mean value of BHC assets is $74.90 billion, versus $82.89 
billion in Elyasiani & Zhang (2015). The mean total loans percentage is 64.2% of total assets, versus 62.6% 
in Ellul & Yerramilli (2013) and 66.9% in Zagorchev & Gao (2015).  The mean value of deposits (as a 
percentage of total assets) is 74.5% in our study, versus 68.7% in Ellul & Yerramilli (2013), 73.9% in Aebi, 
Sabato & Schmid (2012) and 73.8% in Zagorchev & Gao (2015).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 presents the Pearson-pairwise correlation analysis for the variables. Risk appetite is positively 
correlated to performance variables including ROA, ROE, other operating income, and LLPs. Items of 
further note includes a positive correlation value for risk appetite and BHC size, not surprising given the 
 
23 
fact that all covered BHCs are required to adopt this risk appetite arrangements as of late 2014. International 
activities are positively correlated with the other income variable, while negative correlation is noted for the 
total loans and international activities, suggesting more internationally active banks are also less likely to be 
involved in lending businesses and instead may embrace transactional banking, investment banking, and 
sales and trading activities. However, we caution any further interpretations at this stage given the lack 
controls for other explanation of BHC performance or risk-taking with simple pairwise correlation analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Multi-variate Analysis – Performance & Risk 
We begin our multi-variate analysis by first examining the determinants of BHC performance by estimating 
panel regressions of the form presented in Equation 1 above.   
 
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 3. The first relevant dependent variable is ROA in the 
first output column. The coefficient for risk appetite in Table 3 indicates a positive and one per cent 
significant relation between risk appetite and ROA. BHCs that practice risk appetite arrangements report 
improved ROA performance by 23.5 basis points, on average. Total loans is also positively and significantly 
related to ROA, suggesting the bread and butter business of banking, making loans, may be relatively 
attractive for BHCs during the sample period. The coefficient for board meeting frequency and ROA is 
negative and significant, indicating meeting frequency declines with greater BHC performance, suggesting 
firms with more board meetings require greater oversight and governance intensity. The next column in 
Table 3 also presents the model for determinants of BHC ROE. Risk appetite is not only positive and one 
per cent significant, but its coefficient value is 1.65 suggesting a material increase of 165 bps in ROE levels 
for those BHCs that adopt risk appetite activities.  
 
Table 3 considers the determinants of other operating income in the following column. Risk appetite 
practices undertaken by BHCs are positive and significantly related to higher levels of other operating 
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income.  This suggests one underlying channel of performance driver in the headline returns noted above 
may originate from non-traditional banking activities, including sales and trading, investment banking, 
advisory and other more volatile sources of revenue as noted earlier. Interestingly, BHC size, board meeting 
frequency and deposits are negatively and significantly related to other operating income in this model, while 
board non-insiders, total loans and institutional share ownership are all also significantly and positively 
related to other operating income in this model.   
 
We also report HPRs the estimations for BHC holding period returns (HPRs). This model indicates that 
adopters of risk appetite are not significantly related to HPRs, notwithstanding the positive relation that 
exists for this risk governance activity and accounting-led performance measures. Stock markets apparently 
may fail to take notice to the emerging risk governance practice of articulating risk appetite.  
 
Next, we observe in Table 3 the estimation results for the three risk-related variables.  We start by examining 
loan loss provisions (LLPs). In this model, a positive (but insignificant) coefficient is reported for risk 
appetite and LLPs. Interestingly, CRO age exhibits a negative and significant coefficient value for LLPs, 
indicating as CROs age, the value of LLPs decline. Board non-insider measure is positively and one per cent 
significant for LLPs, consistent with earlier research suggesting improved corporate governance also is 
related to the income smoothing hypothesis and greater LLPs (Zagorchev & Gao, 2015). Table 3 also 
reports a positive but not significant relationship for risk appetite and the z-score.  
 
Lastly, we review the results of our estimations for risk appetite and tail risk in the final column of Table 3. 
In this model, we observe a negative one per cent significant relationship between risk appetite and tail risk, 
indicating BHCs that practice risk appetite arrangements exhibit lower tail risk. As noted above, BHCs that 
exhibit high tail risk may produce short-term gains but are at risk of a devastating loss later. Such risks are 
not solely addressed by direct regulatory oversight or market discipline, but require intense internal 
monitoring (Ellul, 2015). We next consider this practice on a lagged-basis to investigate for any relation that 
may exist.  
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Multi-variate Analysis – Performance & Risk (Lagged) 
Tables 4 and 5 reports the results of our estimations for the determinants of BHC performance and risk-
taking on a one and two-year lagged basis respectively, so we examine both at the same time within this 
section of the paper. 
 
We first observe our results for risk appetite and ROA in Table 4 which indicate that firms that practice risk 
appetite have a positive and one per cent significant relationship on a one-year lagged basis, which is also 
reported in Table 5 for a two-year lagged basis.  Both models in Tables 4 and 5 also consistently report a 
negative and one per cent significant relation between board meeting frequency and ROA, indicating greater 
board meeting frequency relate significantly to lower BHC performance. In fact, the same relation exists in 
the following columns for both ROE and other operating income on both a one and two-year lagged basis. 
The determinants of ROE on a lagged basis are also presented in Tables 4 and 5. Once again as in un-lagged 
estimations, BHCs that adopt risk appetite frameworks exhibit a one percent significant and positive relation 
to ROE for both one and two-year lagged basis. In these models, total loans and international activities both 
also exhibit a positive relation to ROE, again validating the role that these two variables play as a determinant 
for BHC performance, though the effect is only significant in Table 4.  
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the determinants of other operating income. As with the un-lagged estimations, those 
BHCs that adopt risk appetite processes report higher other operating income at a one-percent statistically 
significant level in both a one and two-year lagged basis. Effectively designed risk appetite arrangements 
would certainly cover those activities that are captured by this income and business category, including 
advisory, transaction banking, sales and trading, investment banking and other non-traditional banking 
businesses. This again adds further evidence as to the underlying channel of outperformance observed in 




As before, risk appetite is not significantly related to HPRs, this time on a lagged basis, confirming the lack 
of acknowledgement of this activity by the equity markets notwithstanding its clear association with 
accounting performance.   
 
Now we examine the determinants of risk measures on a lagged basis.  
 
We begin by evaluating the determinants of loan loss provisions on a lagged basis in Tables 4 and 5. 
Consistent with the predictions of Wahlen (1994) and Zagorchev & Gao (2015), we find that this corporate 
governance activities, in this case the practice of setting BHC risk appetite, is positively and significantly 
related to loan loss provisions, resonating with the income smoothing hypothesis. Banks that adopt risk 
appetite practices also report higher loan loss provisions. We observe a positive coefficient at the one and 
five percent significant level for risk appetite with one and two-year lags respectively in these models. Also, 
on a lagged basis in Tables 4 and 5, we consider the impact of this risk governance activity upon the z-score. 
The one-year lagged estimation report a positive relation at the five percent significance level (dropping to 
10 percent in the two-year lag), suggesting that adopting BHCs exhibit an improvement of their distance-
to-default risk profile and an improvement in their credit profiles one and two years after adopting this risk 
governance practice.  Lastly, we evaluate the determinants of tail risk on a lagged basis.  The coefficient 
value for risk appetite remains negative but insignificant in lagged estimations.   
 
In summary, we have thus far estimated the relationship of a suite of risk governance mechanisms to BHC 
outcome measures. We observe a consistent and statistically significant relationship between the emerging 
boardroom practice of risk appetite practices and selected BHC performance measures for both an un-
lagged and on a lagged basis. The relation with other variables including risk-taking measures are more 
complex and less consistent than in the case of the performance variables, with the exception of tail risk. In 
the next further analysis section, we examine a sub-sample of BHCs to appreciate how BHC size or the 




[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
Multi-variate Analysis – Further Analysis: Mandatory Adopters  
We now delimit larger BHCs which are mandatory adopters of risk appetite arrangements as defined in the 
Federal Register (2014a) from those that are smaller and not subject to the heightened regulatory standards. 
Both larger (mandatory) and smaller BHCs may have adopted risk appetite practices, but we argue that their 
motivations for doing so are different. Mandatory adopters must demonstrate their compliance with this 
practice whereas voluntary adopters choose to do so and may have other motivations to follow this practice, 
consistent with institutional theories of corporate governance, such as box-ticking exercises. Once again, 
we apply the same model set-up. In Table 6 for each dependent variable, we have estimated a suite of 
regressions for only for BHCs that are mandatory adopters of risk appetite (or those banks with greater than 
$50 billion in assets) in order to isolate only their determinants of BHC performance and risk-taking. 
 
In Table 6, we report the results for performance for mandatory adopters of risk appetite arrangements. 
These regressions are re-estimated again and reported for our full suite of dependent variables. The 
coefficient values remain positive and significant at the five per cent level for ROE and other operating 
income.  The later result continues to support the possible outperformance originates from the channel of 
non-traditional banking activities such as sales and trading as well as investment banking, traditionally more 
volatile source of revenue. The relation of risk appetite to ROA is positive and only ten per cent significant 
in this model. These results for the determinants of performance in this model suggest that mandatory 
adopters are exhibiting a positive impact from adopting this risk governance.  
 
Further evidence is noted in this model when examining the impact of risk committee size and other 
operating income.  The coefficient in this model is negative and five percent significant, indicating smaller 
risk committees may be playing an active role in risk governance relating to those more volatile and non-
traditional banking activities that feed into this outcome measure. Across the performance models and now 
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the z-score, BHCs that are required to adopt risk appetite practices as noted by the Federal Register (2014a) 
consistently report a robust positive relationship to the dependent variable.  
 
Mandatory adopters of this risk governance practice exhibit a positive association across several BHC 
performance measures, including ROA, ROE, other operating income and the z-score. If mandatory 
adopters failed to display a positive relation, this might call into question the efficacy of this internal 
monitoring practice as seen through the lens of agency theory. However, the evidence presented is contrary 
to this position and continuation of the association between risk appetite practices and selected outcomes 
remains robust. 
 
In summary, here we have isolated those BHCs that are expressly covered by the enhanced requirement for 
risk appetite practices from smaller BHCs that may or may not adopt these measures on a voluntary basis. 
We observe in our examinations that larger mandatory BHCs which adopt this practice continue exhibit a 
relation to a suite of BHC outcome measures. As before, this risk governance activity is not associated with 
the holding period returns of the BHC but primarily accounting variables. In the next section, we employ 
different empirical approaches including alternative explanations for our findings, consider the potential for 
omitted variables, and conduct a differences-in-differences analysis to extend our examination and test our 
findings further. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Robustness – Examining Risk Committee Expertise 
The Federal Register (2014a and 2014b) disseminated the new risk governance practices applicable to BHCs, 
and we have conducted an examination relating to risk appetite statements, the existence of the risk 




But other risk governance impacts introduced at the same time may be driving the results observed in our 
study.  We thus identify from this regulatory change another potential exploratory variable which has been 
recently adopted that may otherwise be driving our findings.   Beyond the presence of a risk committee, the 
heightened risk governance standards also require covered BHCs to ensure that the risk committee has at 
least one member with risk expertise in identifying, assessing, and managing risk exposures (Federal Register, 
2014b, p. 17286). This expertise requirement provides a further opportunity to test the role of the risk 
committee in our study for any linkage to BHC outcomes. 
 
The existing evidence found within the literature relating to directors’ risk expertise levels is mixed as noted 
above. In view of the mixed position taken by the academic literature, board-level risk committee member 
expertise can be now probed with BHC performance and risk outcomes, given the unambiguous 
requirement voiced by bank supervisors for experienced risk committee members at the board level. The 
new predictor variable in this next battery of estimations is risk committee financial expertise which is the 
percentage of risk committee members with the relevant executive expertise as defined in seminal 
literature.12 This definition is also found in the Appendix 2.  
 
Table 7 presents the results of the determinants of BHC performance and risk-taking, now including BHC 
risk committee financial expertise as the key explanatory variable. We retain risk appetite as an explanatory 
variable within these estimations as well. In nearly all models, risk committee financial expertise as an 
explanatory variable is not significantly related to our suite of BHC outcome measures, calling into doubt 
its role in explaining our earlier findings. However, the retained explanatory variable, risk appetite, continues 
to exhibit a positive and significant relation across the same suite of relevant performance variables, whereas 
the coefficient for tail risk weakens in significance but remains negative.    
 
There are two exceptions of note. First, is the relationship of risk committee expertise and HPRs (which 
also was not significant in earlier estimations). Interestingly, this suggests that stock markets value the 
expertise and possibly composition of the risk committee over the activities they perform such as risk 
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governance duties. The final outcome variable of note is the z-score that reports a one percent negative 
value for BHCs with experienced risk committee members, suggesting risk committee members may be able 
to tolerate greater risk-taking by the BHC, as measured by the z-score, versus less experienced members, 
also as noted in Minton, Williamson and Taillard (2014).  
 
Empirical predictions easily may have been different, as financial expertise should produce lower costs of 
acquiring and processing financial data and information related to complex banking activities and driving 
performance gains (Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2014). However, this feature of recently introduced 
risk governance does not explain our earlier results, which thus remain in good standing so far.13    
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Robustness – Mitigating Omitted Variables 
We next seek to mitigate omitted variables and include other reasonable explanatory variables in our analyses 
(Antonakis et al., 2010) by adding an extended suite of controls upon further consideration of the literature, 
following Vyas (2011) and Black & Kim (2012).  
 
We noted earlier that board size is an often-used explanatory factor linked to BHC performance and risk-
taking, as informational requirements for larger or more complex banks call for larger boards to share the 
burden of monitoring (Pathan & Skully, 2010). As noted earlier, the literature is ambiguous about this 
corporate governance mechanism, with Adams & Mehran (2012) finding a positive relation between these 
variables while literature by Pathan and Faff (2013) and more recently Mamatzakis & Bermpei (2015) 
suggests board size has a negative relation to performance. We collect from Bloomberg the number of 
directors for each year of the sample as an explanatory variable for our next round of estimations.  The 




Our research could also be criticised for failing to recognize important agency dynamics between 
management and shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The incentives for risk-
taking by bank management will depend on the extent to which their interests are aligned to shareholders 
(Saunders, Strock & Travlos, 1990; Demsetz, Saidenberg & Stahan, 1997). CEOs are well placed to limit or 
allow excessive risk-taking (Fortin, Goldberg & Roth, 2010; Gropp & Köhler, 2010; Aebi, Sabato & Schmid, 
2012).  
 
Unlike diversified investors, CEOs may lose a significant portion of their invested wealth if the BHC fails 
(Devriese et al., 2004). Thus, CEO share incentives, which play an increasingly important role in overall 
CEO remuneration, may provide incentives relating to risk-taking (Pathan, 2009). While CEO remuneration 
consists typically may consist of cash, bonus and equity-related incentives, we focus on the market value of 
shares held by the CEO given its potential to be a determinant in BHC performance or risk-taking. Adams 
& Mehran (2003) reports that on average each BHC CEO holds nearly $28 million in shares, lower than 
non-financial firm CEOs but still a sizable sum. Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011) report a positive relation 
between executive remuneration and share performance for US banks. Pathan (2009) and Pathan & Skully 
(2010) employ a measure of CEO share ownership as a proxy to examine CEO power.  In the former, the 
author finds that strong boards are associated with more BHC risk-taking, whereas strong CEOs can serve 
as a bulwark against excessive risk-taking. This resonates with Fortin et al. 2010, who examine US BHCs 
and finds that bank CEOs with greater power, achieved via share ownership or other mechanisms, take less 
risk.  We collect the market value of BHC shares held by BHCs CEOs from Bloomberg and employ its log 
value for the next set of estimations. The average value for this variable is USD 15.9 million. 
 
CEO power may relate to CEO duality where power is concentrated with one governance actor, hindering 
monitoring (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Chen, Lin & Yi, 2008; Pathan, 2009). Pi and Timme (1993) posit 
that duality can lead to exacerbated agency conflicts. They find a negative relationship between duality and 
performance, consistent with Grove et al. (2011), who also find that duality is negatively related to ROA 
and market returns.  However, Byrd et al. (2012) present empirical evidence that the presence of duality for 
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a sample of US thrifts was related to lower failure rates, on average, during the 1980s.  This latter result 
resonates with Mamatzakis & Bermpei (2015) who finds duality has a significant and positive result on 
performance, which chimes with stewardship theories of corporate governance that indicate that a powerful 
CEO serves as a prudent steward of the firm’s asset base and risk profile (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). CEO 
duality information is collected from BoardEx. CEO duality is measured with a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if the same individual holds the Chairman and CEO role, and 0 otherwise. CEO duality is 
observed in 52% of our sample. 
 
The inclusion of these further explanatory variables in our baseline estimations does not alter our overall 
findings, in unreported results.  Risk appetite records a one-percent significant and positive relation to ROA 
and other operating income whereas ROE records a five-percent significant and positive association with 
these new explanatory variables added to our baseline estimations.  The addition of these expanded variables 
to our baseline estimations results in tail risk reporting ten percent significant coefficient value, which is 
weaker than before but still negative.  
 
Across this a battery extended explanatory variables, our initial findings are upheld with respect to the role 
of the adoption of risk appetite frameworks by the board of directors and BHC outcome measures, notably 
performance measures.  We next turn to a further method of analysis to extend our suite of robustness tests. 
 
Robustness – Differences-in-Differences 
While a randomized experiment would be an ideal remedy to infer causality in empirical research, replicating 
such opportunities are often practically challenging for researchers (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003).   
However, another credible means towards inferring a potential causal relationship occurs in corporate 
governance research when there is simultaneously a change in laws or regulation assessed in a differences-




By employing a differences-in-differences design, we extend our research further with what may be the most 
remaining credible empirical approach, as it studies events that occur outside the firm’s control (i.e., a change 
in regulation or laws) rather than a change in firm’s choices (Love, 2010).  The differences-in-differences 
(DiD) design method has a long history in econometrics generally and in banking-led research specifically. 
It is used for estimating the effects of policy change or intervention (Lechner, 2010; Black and Kim, 2012). 
Berger, Roman and Sedunov (2016) assess the impact of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on US 
BHCs using DiD to find that that the bailout led to statistically significant decreases in systemic risk levels. 
Berger, Kick and Schaeck (2014) consider changes in executive board composition with DiD estimations 
and find a robust positive relationship between younger executives and risk-taking. Black and Kim (2012) 
use DiD in their sample of Korean commercial firms after the changes to corporate governance regulations 
and related laws for large (treated) and small (control) firms and find that the latter enjoy valuation gains 
making a robust argument towards causality. DiD facilitate an assessment of the impact of regulatory 
intervention for control and treated groups of BHCs.  
 
The applicable treatment in the context of our research is the adoption of risk appetite arrangements by the 
BHCs.14 The DiD examination offers an alternative technique to assess whether the governance reforms 
predict a impact upon the dependent variable at the right time and when the reforms are adopted as required 
by an external change or shock (Black & Kim, 2008; Love, 2010).   
 
Table 8 illustrates our findings for risk appetite and the suite of BHC performance and risk-taking measures 
using our existing set of control variables as covariates within the DiD analysis. Our DiD analysis largely 
validates our overall earlier findings. The overall DiD results are consistent with our main study regressions. 
BHCs that adopt risk appetite frameworks unambiguously experience gains in performance measures such 
as ROA and ROE.  Further, the association identified with this risk governance practice and tail risk in our 




The DiD analysis validates our underlying testing for the relationship between risk appetite frameworks and 
ROA, ROE, and tail risk. Table 8 presents one and five-percent significant positive DiD results between 
risk appetite and ROA and ROE (respectively) while the relationship with risk appetite and tail risk is five 
percent significant and negative (e.g., tail risk declines). This analysis illustrates an improved performance 
or lower risk-taking for those BHCs that have adopted risk appetite at the BHC board level for these three 
outcomes, adding further evidence to the central role of risk appetite arrangements as an important risk 
governance activity.  The coefficient for risk appetite and other operating income remains positive but losses 
its significance in this model. 
 
On the whole, these DiD results provide yet further evidence of the impact of risk appetite arrangements 
upon BHC operating measures, relying on an alternative empirical method employed in corporate 
governance research following a regulatory change.  
 
Across the robustness section of this paper, we have considered alternative approaches to test the veracity 
of our findings.  First, we examined if other risk governance practices (i.e., risk committee expertise levels) 
introduced might be driving our results. Next, we sought to mitigate omitted variables risk by re-estimating 
our model with an expanded set of control variables with qualitatively similar outcomes.  Lastly, we deployed 
a differences-in-differences framework to strengthen our empirical analysis.  The results of our robustness 
tests validate our initial core findings. BHCs that adopt risk appetite practices exhibit improved headline 
performance measures and report lower tail risks.   
 
The next section presents our conclusions. 
 








Given the idiosyncratic nature of the banking industry, including information asymmetries, risk opacity, 
leverage levels, regulation and resulting systemic risk profile, internal monitoring in banking has been 
identified as a key corporate governance mechanism (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Becht, Bolton & Roëll, 
2011). Following the financial crisis, bank regulators intervened with a set of heightened regulations to 
improve internal monitoring (Federal Register, 2014, Basel, 2015). Some risks, such as tail risk which can 
have a devastating impact upon the risk profile of banks, is not fully mitigated alone by external monitoring 
but require robust risk management practice (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). But simply relying on the existence 
of larger boards alone as a corporate governance practice appears insufficient as they face coordination 
issues and other challenges (Upadhyay, Bhargava and Faircloth, 2014; Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011). 
Conventional external corporate governance features (i.e., direct regulation and market discipline) alone may 
not be enough to curtail excessive risk-taking by banks, relying instead on heightened risk governance 
features to provide improved oversight (Ellul, 2015).  
 
Heightened risk governance activities were introduced to enhance the scope of internal monitoring. Several 
risk governance mechanisms codified into law (Federal Register, 2014) have been analysed in this study for 
their relation to BHC performance measures and risk profiles, including the articulation, approval and 
monitoring of firm-wide risk appetite.   
 
There is little doubt that banks require a strong and knowledgeable board (Greuning and Bratonovic, 2003). 
Catering for enhanced risk governance practices including risk appetite impacts the remit and duties of BHC 
directors and other governance actors (Alix, 2012; Fischer, 2015; Banking Exchange, 2017, Gontarek & 
Bender, 2018). Our research suggests rather than observable features of the risk committee (its size or 
expertise levels, for example), it is the activities performed within these board forums (such as the 
articulation of risk appetite) that may better explain improvements to selected BHC outcome measures. Risk 
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appetite frameworks have a fundamental effect on how banks are managed (Jackson, 2014). However, until 
now, there has been little empirical testing of the efficacy of this risk governance practice.  
 
Compelling empirical evidence is presented in this study for the adoption of board-level risk appetite 
arrangements and their positive impact to BHC outcomes. Risk appetite significantly related to a suite of 
BHC operating performance measures, across a variety of empirical settings. The underlying channel for 
the outperformance maybe income that originates from sales and trading, investment banking and other 
more volatile business lines and are themselves potential generators of tail risk. 
 
Further, we observe a robust negative relation between risk appetite practices at the board level and tail 
risks. Tail risks as noted above cannot be fully mitigated by external monitoring but require robust internal 
risk governance practice (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013, Ellul, 2015). Our findings with respect to lower tail risk 
appear to be related to in part by the adoption of risk appetite frameworks by BHC boards given the critical 
role that internal monitoring plays in the mitigation of tail risks (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013).  
 
In effect, adopting risk appetite frameworks is associated with both better performing banks that are also 
less exposed to tail risks, thus promoting long-term value maximization.  
 
Our findings chime with the seminal conceptual predictions. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008) and Ellul 
(2015) flag the potential for agency conflicts within banks and posit that risk managers were unaware or 
unable to restrain traders and risk-takers during the financial crisis. Moreover, tail risk cannot be entirely 
captured by external monitoring and market discipline alone but requires robust governance arrangements 
to detect and control risks effectively. Risk appetite practices are a critical aspect of better risk management 
in banks given the agency conflicts present. Our study resonates with Jackson (2014) whom argues that 




The dissemination of risk appetite frameworks to the trading desks, credit underwriting teams, and other 
operating areas may facilitate the development of a disciplined risk-taking culture if aligned with 
compensation frameworks, an area of growing focus in practice (ECB, 2016; Gontarek & Bender, 2018). 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) observe in seminal research that BHCs underlying business model or possibly 
risk culture may determine the choice of risk and the strength of their risk management system. These 
authors posit that conservative BHCs may take lower risk and establish stronger risk management systems, 
while aggressive BHCs take higher risks and put into place weaker risk management controls. Given the 
evidence presented in this research, the articulation, approval and monitoring of risk appetite boundaries by 
BHC boards sit comfortably within the former, more cautious risk management ethos noted by these 
researchers.   
 
Successful risk-taking requires banks to identify good from bad risks (Stulz, 2015).  Within our framework, 
bad risks include those risks which appear profitable in the short-run but can have a devastating impact 
upon bank balance sheet and asset quality later, thus requiring enhanced internal risk governance (Ellul, 
2015). We argue that the articulation, approval and active monitoring of risk appetite by the board risk 
committee contributes to heightened risk governance as actual risk-taking is more effectively aligned with 
strategy and the firm’s capacity to manage risk. 
 
A somewhat surprising secondary finding is that, while risk appetite arrangements and BHC accounting 
measures for performance are significantly and positively related, this governance practice is not significantly 
associated with positive BHC stock returns. This suggests that public security markets may be unaware of 
the significance of the use of risk appetite arrangements and the potential to impact underlying operating 
performance. Regulators may consider publishing in their call reports (including BHC Y9 reports) 
information on the use of risk appetite in order to illuminate this board practice for investors, counterparties 
and bank customers. This measure might also promote greater market discipline and improve the 
transparency of BHC risk profiles in historically opaque risk-taking activities. Supervisors may also wish to 
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consider risk appetite profiles when generating system-wide stress test scenarios as a tool to capture systemic 
risks (Woo, Chelluboina & Xoual, 2014; Dowd, 2016). 
 
Seminal bank corporate governance research call for the development of improved tools that may signal 
risks in a timelier manner as well as dissemination of risk-based information as a means to enhance 
monitoring (Claessens and Kodres, 2014). Unless there are robust risk governance practices in place, it may 
be difficult to constrain excessive risk-taking (Ellul, 2015). Bank supervisors echoed these calls with the 
requirement to adopt new corporate governance standards: “Another important objective is to emphasize 
key components of the risk governance responsibility of the board of directors, such as a risk committee, 
risk appetite and its relationship to a bank’s risk capacity” (Basel, 2015).  
 
One expert adds: “Better articulation of risk appetite, facilitated with the appropriate infrastructure and 
supported by a strong risk culture, should improve firm governance and performance… While global 
regulators have pushed for progress, this cannot be viewed as simply a regulatory compliance exercise - or 
it will be doomed to fail” (Jackson, 2014). It is the board’s responsibility to judge and monitor the risk 
appetite of the firm (ECB, 2018). Our research confirms the practice of risk appetite as an important tool 
of the board of directors and the c-suite of financial institutions. This research is important to researchers 
facing a dearth of information about an important risk governance practice required by global bank 
regulators – the articulation of risk appetite by the board of directors. Our study facilitates a better 
understanding of this practice and its impact upon BHC outcomes, addressing the existing knowledge gap. 
The existence of risk appetite frameworks as board level practice should be an explanatory variable in 
empirical research.  
 
Board directors, CEOs and CROs as practitioners will find this research an important validation of the 
practice of risk governance. Policy makers and bank supervisors will benefit from our findings when 
considering the appropriateness of the key risk governance arrangements adopted thus far and respond to 
calls for a relaxation of bank regulation. Critics argue that the regulatory environment has become costlier. 
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BHCs are subject to new direct regulatory costs of some $2 billion per year, resulting in lending reductions 
up to $20 billion (Federal Financial Analytics, 2015). Today, there are attempts to reduce the burden of 
director’s duties relating to risk management (Banking Exchange, 2017). While such adjustments may be 
ultimately appropriate and positive, it is important to be unambiguous about which aspects of the Dodd-
Frank related heightened risk governance requirements appear meaningfully contribute to BHC 
performance and risk profiles within an evidence-based framework.  
 
This begs the question of whether or not the broad set of heightened risk governance standards introduced 
in the US post Dodd-Frank Act (Federal Register, 2014a, 2014b) enhance BHC performance levels and 
reduce risks or alternatively are un-necessary box-ticking exercises. As for risk appetite activities practiced 
by US bank risk committees, the answer to this question is empirically addressed within this study. This 
article seeks to contribute meaningfully to the current debate underway in policy circles in the US, as policy-
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Appendix 1: List of BHCs 
 
# BHC Name # BHC Name # BHC Name 
1 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 47 TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES 94 FIRST FNCL BSHRS 
2 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 48 PACWEST BANCORP 95 First Bank 
3 WELLS FARGO & CO 49 UMB FINANCIAL CORP 96 RENASANT CORP 
4 CITIGROUP INC 50 PRIVATEBANCORP INC 97 FIRST MERCHANTS CORP 
5 US BANCORP INC 51 IBERIA BANCORP 98 TOWNEBANK 
6 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES INC 52 F N B CORP 99 OPUS BK 
7 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON  53 BANK OF HAWAII CORP 100 EAGLE BANCORP, INC 
8 STATE STREET CORP 54 ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP  101 TALMER BANCORP INC. 
9 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 55 WASHINGTON FED INC  102 UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 
10 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 56 MB FINANCIAL INC/MD 103 STIFEL FNCL CORP 
11 BB&T CORP 57 RAYMOND JAMES FNCL  104 FLUSHING FC 
12 AMERICAN EXPRESS CORP 58 BANCORPSOUTH INC 105 WESTAMERICA BANC CORP 
13 FIFTH THIRD CORP 59 FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 106 NATIONAL BK HOLDS CORP 
14 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 60 TRUSTMARK CORP 107 S & T BANCORP INC 
15 MORGAN STANLEY 61 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 108 BANNER CORP 
16 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 62 OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 109 CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL  
17 NORTHERN TRUST CORP 63 WESTERN ALLIANCE BANC 110 BANCORP  
18 ALLY FINANCIAL CORP 64 INTL BANCSHARES CORP 111 1ST SOURCE CORP 
19 M&T BANK CORP 65 CAPITOL FEDERAL FINANCIAL  112 SIMMONS FIRST NAT CORP 
20 KEYCORP 66 FULTON FINANCIAL CORP 113 TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY  
21 DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES 67 NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARE 114 WILSHIRE BANCORP INC. 
22 COMERICA INC 68 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SVSC  115 SANDY SPRING BANCORP INC. 
23 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 69 COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM  116 SERVISFIRST BANCSHARES  
24 FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 70 FIRST INTERSTATE BANCSYS  117 NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP  
25 FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP 71 GLACIER BANCORP, INC. 118 YADKIN FINANCIAL CORP 
26 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 72 NBT BANCORP INC 119 BNC BANCORP 
27 PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL INC 73 STERLING BANCORP 120 AMERIS BANCORP 
28 CITY NATIONAL CORP  74 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS  121 HANMI FIN CORP 
29 KEYCORP 75 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM  122 GREAT SOUTHERN BANCORP  
30 BOK FINANCIAL CORP 76 CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP 123 FIRST NBC BHC 
31 EAST WEST BANCORP 77 HOME BANCSHARES, INC. 124 REPUBLIC BANCORP 
32 SIGNATURE BANK 78 CVB FINANCIAL CORP 125 TRICO BANCSHARES 
33 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 79 UNION BANKSHARES CORP  126 CENTERSTATE BANKS INC. 
34 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 80 BBCN BANCORP INC 127 FIRST BUSEY CORP 
35 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 81 PARK NATIONAL CORP 128 CENTURY BANCORP INC 
36 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 82 FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP  129 COMMUNITY TR BANCORP INC 
37 FIRSTMERIT CORP 83 CUSTOMERS BC 130 LAKELAND BANCORP INC 
38 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 84 CAPITAL BK FNCL CORP  131 WASHINGTON TR BC INC 
39 PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 85 INDEPENDENT BANK Corp 132 HERITAGE FC 
40 CIT GROUP 86 POPULAR INC 133 CARDINAL FC 
41 HANCOCK HOLDING CO 87 BOSTON PRIVATE FINL  134 FIDELITY SOUTHERN CORP 
42 TCF FINANCIAL CORP 88 BANCFIRST CORP 135 WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 
43 BANKUNITED INC 89 BERKSHIRE HILLS BANCORP  136 DIME COMMUNITY BANCS 
44 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 90 LEGACYTEXAS FNCL GRP 137 MAINSOURCE FNCL GRP 
45 VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 91 FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL 138 COBIZ FNCL INC 
46 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES  92 PINNACLE FNCL PTNR 139 BRYN MAWR BK CORP 
  93 BANC OF CALIFORNIA INC. 140 BANK MUTUAL CORP 

















Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
 





1. BHC Assets Explanatory USD value (log) of BHC assets from the US Federal Reserve Bank website for 
each year-end reporting period.   
 
2.  BOD meetings 
Number 
Explanatory Number of board meetings held within that year, a proxy for board monitoring, 
collected from BoardEx. 
 
3. BOD Non-inside 
Directors 
percentage 
Explanatory Percentage of supervisory directors, as published by BoardEx, denoting directors 
who are not currently affiliated with management; also referred to as non-inside 
directors. 
 
4. Deposits % Explanatory  Measured as total deposits divided by total assets as collected from Bloomberg. 
 
5.  HPR Dependent BHCs’ annual holding period returns (HPR) is collected from Bloomberg and 
assumes dividends re-invested in equity securities. 
6. Institutional 
shareholding % 




Explanatory Percentage of non-domestic revenue for each BHC collected from Bloomberg and 
used in risk-related outcome estimations. 
 
8. Loan loss 
provisions % 
 
 Loan loss provisions (LLP) is measured as the total loan loss provision divided by 
total assets and is collected via Bloomberg (Kanagartnam & Lobo, 2003; Zagorchev 
& Gao, 2015).  
 
9. Other Operating 
Income % 
 
Explanatory Income not generated from the ordinary banking business (linked to net interest 
margin), including sales and trading, insurance sales, commissions, fees, and 
advisory income divided by BHC total assets.  Collected via Bloomberg 
10. ROA Dependent ROA is the return on total assets at year-end collected via Bloomberg. 
 
11. ROE Dependent  ROE is the return on equity at year-end collected via Bloomberg. 
 
  
12. Risk appetite % Explanatory Existence of risk appetite arrangements at the BHC board levels was hand-
collected from BHC risk committee charters collected   
 
13.  Risk Committee # Explanatory The risk committee number of members, as reported in BoardEx.  
 
14. Risk Committee 
financial 
expertise % 
Explanatory Risk Committee member expertise is defined in Minton, Taillard and Williamson 
(2014) and Güner et al. (2008) as independent director meeting the one of the 
following criteria: has been an executive of a bank, an executive of a non-bank 
financial institution, holds a financial position within a non-financial corporation, 
holds an academic position related to the field, or works in fund or investment 
management as a professional investor. This classification was determined using 
BoardEx data and reviewing the biographical details for each director. 
 
15. Tail Risk Dependent Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average return on the firm’s stock over 
the five per cent worst days in a given year, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013).  
These authors explain that poorly designed incentives can encourage traders to 
take on excessive risks that reward shareholders in the short term to only damage 
the firm over time. Data collected from Bloomberg. 
 
16. Total loans % Explanatory Total loans are the total loans dividend by total assets as collected via Bloomberg. 
 
17. Z-score Dependent We follow Laeven & Levine (2009) and define the z-score the mean value of the 
annual ROA plus Capital Asset Ratio or “CAR”, divided by the standard deviation 
of annual ROA for over each of the proceeding four years. For CAR, we collect 
from Bloomberg the Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio (also known as the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio). Where not available, we use Tier 1 & 2 Capital to risk weighted 




    
X. TABLES 




Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max 
Risk appetite % 564 0.268 0.443 0 0 1 
CRO age 396 54.909 6.781 55 34 70 
RC number 375 5.04 1.745 5 0 12 
BHC assets 564 74.967 267877 72.019 1175 2.096 
BHC assets (log) 564 9.461 1.483 8.951 7.069 14.556 
Number BOD meeting number 470 10.189 3.992 10 2 26 
BOD non-insider % 557 0.868 0.074 0.889 0.167 1 
Total loans % 560 64.222 15.738 67.885 5.529 96.167 
Deposits % 560 74.553 11.454 77.729 22.004 90.591 
Institutional ownership % 545 75.146 19.392 78.422 0.682 100 
International activities % 564 0.03 0.095 0 0 0.58 
ROA 560 1.023 0.568 0.967 -1.877 4.337 
ROE 560 9.096 5.096 8.87 -17.717 49.251 
Other operating income % 561 0.0044 0.0159 .00156 -0.0120 0.1625 
HPR 535 20.683 26.998 15.317 -24.218 284.158 
Loan loss provisions  536 0.201 0.309 0.137 -1.248 2.062 
Tail Risk 541 -27.568 25.383 -20.157 -221.74 -3.306 













































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1.Risk Appetite 1
2.CRO Age -0.0602 1
3.RC size 0.0691 -0.0254 1
4.BHC Size 0.2813* -0.1111 0.0541 1
5.# BOD Meeting 0.081 -0.1871* 0.0748 0.2263* 1
6.BOD non-insider 0.0641 0.0114 0.0365 0.1712* 0.1096 1
7.Total loans -0.1342* 0.1272 -0.0873 -0.3240* -0.0105 -0.0188 1
8.Deposits -0.2425* 0.1723* -0.0481 -0.3231* -0.1819* -0.0105 0.3223* 1
9.INST OWN 0.2572* 0.088 0.008 0.0601 0.0425 0.032 -0.1251* -0.1612* 1
10.International Act. 0.2718* -0.1231 0.0901 0.5893* 0.2498* 0.1572* -0.6068* -0.5820* 0.1795* 1
11.ROA 0.1055 0.0287 -0.0706 -0.0319 -0.0683 -0.0446 0.0427 -0.097 0.0883 0.042 1
12.ROE 0.0426 0.0919 -0.0517 -0.0089 -0.0396 -0.0163 0.0252 0.0591 0.0317 0.0452 0.8796* 1
13.Efficiency Ratio -0.047 -0.0739 0.0442 0.0299 0.0546 0.0569 -0.1760* -0.1861* 0.1013 0.1405* -0.4508* -0.4891* 1
14.HPR -0.1487* 0.0097 -0.0777 0.0205 0.0832 0.0355 0.0355 0.032 -0.0453 0.008 0.056 0.1224* -0.0305 1
15.LLP 0.0613 -0.2001* -0.002 0.0518 0.1169 0.0787 0.061 -0.2016* -0.037 0.142* 0.0972 0.0553 0.0277 0.1819* 1
16.Margin 0.0576 0.0921 -0.0352 -0.0359 -0.08 -0.0762 0.1472* 0.1645* -0.0448 -0.116* 0.4766* 0.4973* -0.9353* -0.0157 -0.3731* 1
17.Tail Risk -0.2686* 0.009 -0.1579* -0.1210* 0.06 0.1776* 0.2901* 0.1372* -0.2291* -0.290* -0.105 -0.1420* 0.0603 0.1694* -0.0242 -0.0734 1
18.Z score 0.0216 0.0442 0.0496 -0.0006 -0.125 -0.0523 -0.0247 0.1233* -0.1786* -0.103 0.1447* 0.2415* -0.3664* -0.2270* -0.1270* 0.3729* -0.2729 1
 
69 
Table 3: BHC Performance & Risk Determinants 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable identified at the top of each column. Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust standard errors.  Estimations include year-dummies but not reported.  Significance 
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 ROA ROE Other Op. Income HPR LLP Z-score Tail Risk 
Risk 
Appetite 
0.235*** 1.659** 0.00892*** -1.927 0.0123 0.0433 -8.280*** 
 (2.98) (2.50) (4.09) (-0.74) (0.39) (0.48) (-2.85) 
        
CRO Age -0.00617 -0.0381 0.000226 0.229 -0.00947** -0.00942* 0.0644 
 (-0.95) (-0.74) (1.37) (1.40) (-2.52) (-1.81) (0.32) 
        
RC size  -0.0242* -0.183 -0.00134** -0.513 0.0144 -0.00315 -3.145** 
 (-1.70) (-1.50) (-2.02) (-1.00) (1.26) (-0.15) (-2.56) 
        
BHC Size 0.0350 0.553** -0.00429*** 1.443 0.0254* 0.0873*** -1.485 
 (1.04) (2.24) (-3.97) (1.49) (1.76) (3.08) (-1.26) 
        
# BOD 
Meeting 
-0.034*** -0.286*** -0.00103*** -0.156 -0.00526 -0.00407 0.418 
 (-3.53) (-3.64) (-3.60) (-0.58) (-1.24) (-0.43) (1.24) 
        
BOD non-
insider 
-0.658 -7.157* 0.0587*** 9.223 0.719*** -1.794*** 107.2*** 
 (-1.16) (-1.81) (3.64) (0.65) (2.90) (-3.58) (3.61) 
        
Total loans 0.0116*** 0.0749** 0.000173** 0.113 0.00698*** -0.00329 0.379*** 
 (3.35) (2.53) (2.04) (1.25) (3.20) (-1.23) (3.04) 
        
Deposits -0.00767 0.00349 -0.00105*** 0.0620 -0.00834** 0.00772** 0.0237 
 (-1.10) (0.07) (-4.32) (0.63) (-2.54) (2.15) (0.16) 
        
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.00148 0.0107 0.000233*** 0.0223 0.00363*** -0.00393* -0.221** 
 (0.70) (0.62) (3.66) (0.28) (2.74) (-1.65) (-2.22) 
        
International 
Activities 
0.860 9.050* 0.0315* 19.73 0.170 -0.668 -20.46 
 (1.49) (1.92) (1.85) (1.41) (0.57) (-1.52) (-1.08) 
        
Constant 1.622** 8.335* 0.0440** -44.66** -0.175 2.298*** -107.4*** 
 (2.28) (1.69) (2.30) (-2.11) (-0.48) (4.03) (-3.70) 
Observations 250 250 250 247 235 240 248 





Table 4: BHC Performance & Risk Determinants (one-year lag) 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable identified at the top of each column.  Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust standard errors.  Estimations include year-dummies but not reported.  Significance 
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 ROA ROE Other Op. Income HPR LLP Z-score Tail Risk 
Risk 
Appetite 
0.300*** 1.843*** 0.0112*** -0.351 0.0933*** 0.206** -6.721 
 (3.82) (2.78) (4.03) (-0.15) (2.66) (2.48) (-1.65) 
        
CRO Age -0.00363 -0.0198 0.000217 0.0958 -0.00987** -0.00856 -0.0315 
 (-0.58) (-0.39) (1.14) (0.66) (-2.45) (-1.57) (-0.13) 
        
RC size  -0.0358** -0.279** -0.00143* -0.219 0.0165 -0.0261 -3.469** 
 (-2.09) (-2.02) (-1.85) (-0.49) (1.21) (-1.23) (-2.28) 
        
BHC Size 0.00956 0.443* -0.00418*** 0.907 0.00857 0.0578** -1.786 
 (0.35) (1.89) (-3.62) (1.20) (0.58) (2.09) (-1.19) 
        
# BOD 
Meeting 
-0.0427*** -0.342*** -0.000862*** -0.168 -0.00756* -0.0102 0.215 
 (-5.23) (-4.88) (-3.08) (-0.62) (-1.82) (-1.13) (0.53) 
        
BOD non-
insider 
-0.508 -6.072 0.0590*** -4.731 0.575** -1.520*** 112.2*** 
 (-0.95) (-1.58) (3.31) (-0.38) (2.26) (-2.98) (3.05) 
        
Total loans 0.0114*** 0.0750** 0.000114 -0.0336 0.00588** -0.00450 0.396** 
 (3.23) (2.44) (1.24) (-0.35) (2.22) (-1.55) (2.49) 
        
Deposits -0.0160*** -0.0479 -0.00106*** 0.0730 -0.0103*** 0.00613* 0.111 
 (-2.74) (-0.98) (-3.92) (0.66) (-3.06) (1.70) (0.59) 
        
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.00256 0.0137 0.000214*** 0.0985 0.00389*** -0.00526** -0.235* 
 (1.35) (0.84) (3.10) (1.41) (2.78) (-2.26) (-1.90) 
        
International 
Activities 
1.000 10.36** 0.0263 -4.099 0.181 -0.705 -20.88 
 (1.63) (1.99) (1.37) (-0.29) (0.50) (-1.39) (-0.90) 
        
Constant 2.274*** 12.11*** 0.0485** -18.30 0.132 2.349*** -101.0*** 
 (3.53) (3.04) (2.44) (-1.01) (0.36) (4.47) (-2.86) 
Observations 195 195 195 194 182 190 193 





Table 5: BHC Performance & Risk Determinants (two-year lag) 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable identified at the top of each column.  Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust standard errors.  Estimations include year-dummies but not reported.  Significance 
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 ROA ROE Other Op. Income HPR LLP Z-score Tail Risk 
Risk 
Appetite 
0.309*** 2.381*** 0.0131*** -0.704 0.102** 0.182* -1.923 
 (3.31) (3.08) (3.14) (-0.27) (2.00) (1.68) (-0.32) 
        
CRO Age -0.00123 -0.00622 0.000207 -0.0344 -0.0103* -0.00324 -0.158 
 (-0.15) (-0.10) (0.82) (-0.22) (-1.81) (-0.46) (-0.45) 
        
RC size  -0.0293 -0.267 -0.00148 0.162 0.00919 -0.0135 -3.707* 
 (-1.37) (-1.54) (-1.63) (0.32) (0.49) (-0.48) (-1.89) 
        
BHC Size -0.00213 0.299 -0.00434*** 1.132 0.00664 0.0724* -3.438* 
 (-0.06) (1.01) (-2.81) (1.38) (0.36) (1.91) (-1.74) 
        
# BOD 
Meeting 
-0.0467*** -0.352*** -0.000850** 0.0454 -0.00744 -0.00796 0.669 
 (-4.54) (-4.05) (-2.30) (0.15) (-1.36) (-0.69) (1.24) 
        
BOD non-
insider 
-0.533 -5.434 0.0552** -21.52 0.483 -1.316** 123.5** 
 (-0.80) (-1.24) (2.45) (-1.53) (1.50) (-2.37) (2.36) 
        
Total loans 0.0109** 0.0735* 0.0000250 0.0627 0.00396 -0.00215 0.323 
 (2.50) (1.95) (0.21) (0.59) (1.07) (-0.55) (1.48) 
        
Deposits -0.0180** -0.0486 -0.00101*** 0.142 -0.0117*** 0.00681 0.154 
 (-2.48) (-0.82) (-2.94) (1.15) (-2.78) (1.59) (0.61) 
        
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.00168 0.00150 0.000170** -0.0368 0.00528** -0.00592* -0.249 
 (0.72) (0.08) (2.03) (-0.48) (2.57) (-1.88) (-1.47) 
        
International 
Activities 
1.158 11.95* 0.0231 7.026 -0.0476 -0.824 -29.02 
 (1.48) (1.76) (0.93) (0.44) (-0.10) (-1.22) (-0.87) 
        
Constant 2.535*** 13.30** 0.0597** -2.613 0.417 1.930*** -94.67* 
 (2.87) (2.43) (2.24) (-0.15) (0.84) (3.34) (-1.98) 
Observations 127 127 127 126 118 123 125 





Table 6: BHC Performance & Risk Determinants (mandatory adopters) 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable identified at the top of each column.  Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust standard errors.  Estimations include year-dummies but not reported.  Significance 
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 ROA ROE Other Op. Income HPR LLP Z-score Tail Risk 
Risk 
Appetite 
0.275* 2.589** 0.0108** -5.990 -0.00707 0.271** -8.655 
 (1.83) (2.17) (2.03) (-1.38) (-0.08) (2.53) (-1.64) 
        
CRO Age -0.0135 -0.130 0.000951 0.379 -0.0182** -0.0205** 1.021** 
 (-0.92) (-1.15) (1.50) (1.06) (-2.29) (-2.22) (2.18) 
        
RC size  -0.0234 -0.235 -0.00294** -0.382 -0.00476 0.00193 -5.676*** 
 (-1.02) (-1.32) (-2.61) (-0.52) (-0.24) (0.13) (-4.71) 
        
BHC Size -0.100** -0.875** -0.00304* 0.146 -0.0727 0.0280 2.794 
 (-2.37) (-2.32) (-1.91) (0.08) (-1.55) (0.73) (1.21) 
        
# BOD 
Meeting 
-0.0665*** -0.671*** -0.000992 0.229 -0.00932 -0.0395*** 2.484*** 
 (-3.72) (-4.55) (-1.29) (0.48) (-0.86) (-3.11) (3.07) 
        
BOD non-
insider 
2.258* 11.69 0.126** 39.10 1.641* -1.129 453.7*** 
 (1.84) (1.07) (2.19) (0.96) (1.86) (-0.98) (4.99) 
        
Total loans 0.0252*** 0.157*** 0.000251* 0.128 0.0147*** -0.000451 -0.0186 
 (6.57) (4.90) (1.74) (1.02) (5.75) (-0.16) (-0.14) 
        
Deposits -0.0215*** -0.139** -0.00117*** -0.104 -0.0180*** 0.00294 0.288* 
 (-2.94) (-2.60) (-3.21) (-0.77) (-4.45) (0.94) (1.74) 
        
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.0157*** 0.0828* 0.000637** -0.0155 0.0128** 0.00101 0.260 
 (2.67) (1.72) (2.20) (-0.07) (2.09) (0.21) (0.71) 
        
International 
Activities 
2.010*** 17.99*** 0.00653 12.71 0.889* 0.109 -78.92*** 
 (3.39) (3.51) (0.31) (0.69) (1.90) (0.26) (-3.31) 
        
Constant 0.208 15.60 -0.0913 -56.74 0.0825 2.121 -549.5*** 
 (0.12) (1.05) (-1.13) (-1.13) (0.05) (1.47) (-5.24) 
Observations 87 87 87 86 78 84 87 




Table 7: BHC Performance & Risk Determinants (risk committee financial expertise added as explanatory variable) 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable identified at the top of each column. Heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust standard errors.  Estimations include year-dummies but not reported.  Significance 
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 ROA ROE Other Op. Income HPR LLP Z-score Tail Risk 
RC Financial  -0.344 -2.477 -0.00923 11.59** 0.0575 -0.459*** 2.100 
Expertise (-1.55) (-1.27) (-1.39) (2.25) (0.58) (-2.83) (0.35) 
        
Risk 
Appetite 
0.234** 1.813** 0.00886*** -0.988 -0.00399 0.0989 -5.734* 
 (2.55) (2.34) (3.61) (-0.35) (-0.11) (0.91) (-1.83) 
        
CRO Age -0.00592 -0.0245 0.000249* 0.289 -0.00890** -0.0105* 0.113 
 (-0.86) (-0.45) (1.69) (1.64) (-2.29) (-1.80) (0.56) 
        
RC size  -0.0316* -0.180 -0.00128* -0.247 0.0110 -0.0184 -2.350* 
 (-1.82) (-1.15) (-1.69) (-0.38) (0.89) (-0.72) (-1.78) 
        
BHC Size 0.0407 0.571* -0.00433*** 1.646 0.0278* 0.0788** -1.612 
 (1.02) (1.96) (-3.54) (1.47) (1.71) (2.38) (-1.36) 
        
# BOD 
Meeting 
-0.0317*** -0.284*** -0.000992*** -0.191 -0.00620 0.000246 0.373 
 (-3.00) (-3.43) (-3.20) (-0.70) (-1.36) (0.02) (1.10) 
        
BOD non-
insider 
-0.865 -7.415* 0.0501*** 27.72* 0.802*** -2.055*** 94.19*** 
 (-1.33) (-1.68) (3.08) (1.80) (2.82) (-3.66) (3.13) 
        
Total loans 0.0121*** 0.0776** 0.000215** 0.0555 0.00825*** -0.00344 0.356*** 
 (3.05) (2.31) (2.44) (0.58) (3.37) (-1.13) (2.61) 
        
Deposits -0.00440 0.0260 -0.00101*** 0.0411 -0.00681* 0.00819** -0.0390 
 (-0.59) (0.47) (-3.97) (0.39) (-1.91) (2.07) (-0.23) 
        
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.00148 0.0103 0.000226*** 0.0100 0.00361** -0.00446 -0.260** 
 (0.65) (0.55) (3.29) (0.11) (2.51) (-1.57) (-2.47) 
        
International 
Activities 
1.091 10.73* 0.0416** 15.11 0.323 -0.250 -22.11 
 (1.57) (1.89) (2.44) (0.92) (0.93) (-0.50) (-1.09) 
        
Constant 1.666* 7.664 0.0522*** -42.67* -0.507 2.616*** -85.11*** 
 (1.95) (1.28) (2.71) (-1.77) (-1.25) (3.93) (-2.91) 
Observations 203 203 203 200 191 194 202 




Table 8: BHC Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
Differences-in-Differences analysis.  The dependent variable identified at the top of each column. Control variables used in the above estimations are used in all Differences-in-Differences models as co-variates. Significance 
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 ROA ROE Other Op. Income HPR LLP Z-score Tail Risk 
P>|t| 
Baseline 
0.305 0.410 0.145 0.819 0.452 0773 0.448 
        
P>|t| 
Follow up 
0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.014** 0.536 0.144 0.000*** 




0.005*** 0.025** 0.664 0.309 0.317 0.338 -0.011** 
        
Observations 250 250 250 247 235 240 248 
        
Control 
(Baseline) 
37 37 37 35 35 35 37 
        
Control 
(Follow up) 
106 106 106 105 97 101 104 
        
Treated 
(Baseline) 
18 18 18 18 18 15 18 
        
Treated 
(Follow up) 
89 89 89 89 85 89 89 
        














XI. Endnotes  
1 See the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011); Levine (2012); Prager (2013) and Saunders & Cornett (2018) for more background on the global financial crisis.   
2 In this study, we use the phrase risk appetite frameworks and risk appetite arrangements interchangeably, which defines the overarching policies, processes, 
controls and systems required to communicate and monitor risk appetite (FSB, 2013). 
3 The risk governance framework is defined as the means which the board and management establish the firm’s strategy; articulate and monitor adherence to risk 
appetite and risk limits; and identify, measure and manage risks (FSB, 2013). 
4 The Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) is a group of bank supervisory agencies from leading centers in the US, UK, Switzerland, Germany and France.  
5 For a review of the regulatory response applicable to market risk and the trading book, see Alexander, Baptista & Yan (2015). 
 
6 For an in-depth review of how risk appetite frameworks may practically work in financial institutions and drive performance gains, see Jackson (2014). 
 
7 A forum of senior supervisory authorities and other representatives which evaluate risk management practices, governance, and other issues concerning complex, 
globally-active financial institutions. 
 
8 The risk committee is the board-level sub-committee delegated with the oversight and monitoring of bank-wide risk profiles, comprised largely and chaired by 
non-insider directors.   
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9 Large US BHCs were required to adopt risk appetite practices in September 2014 (Federal Register, 2014a). 
 
10 An example of a BHC risk committee charter may be found for example or SunTrust Banks Inc., a US BHC, at 
http://investors.suntrust.com/governance/corporate-governance-documents/default.aspx. We acknowledge one weakness of using this dummy variable is that it 
cannot be taken for granted that information publically disseminated by BHCs generally reflects actual risk governance practices followed; however, at a minimum, 
its unambiguous publication sends a strong signal of its practice across the firm.  See the Deloitte series of Risk Committee Charters for US banks available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4106_bank-board-risk-governance/4106_bank-board-risk-governance.pdf and a sample risk 
committee charter produced by Deloittes at https://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/pages/governance-risk-and-compliance/articles/sample-risk-committee-
charter.html. 
 
11 The authors wish to thank Dr Ed Altman of NYU Stern for his input here to distinguish different methodologies for the z-score between large industrials, other 
corporate entities, and the bank-related approach we have adopted in our research. See Chiaramonte et al., 2016 for further background. 
 
12 Seminal literature defines this variable as director holding previous executive responsibilities in a banking firm, executive responsibilities in a non-bank financial firm 
or executive financial responsibilities in a non-financial firm, or being an academic in finance or a related discipline, or a professional investor, following Minton, Taillard 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 We also test in un-reported results for specifically when the chairman of the BHC risk committee satisfies this same expertise definition as a dummy variable and re-
run the baseline estimations, given that the leader of this board sub-committee may have notable influence over risk oversight, but again the results are the same as 
before and this predictor value does not explain our results observed earlier. 
  
14 In our sample, twenty BHCs were already treated (i.e. already adopted risk appetite) in the first year of the sample in 2012, so the impact of these early adopters was 
coded in order to ensure all BHCs were reported as untreated in 2012 (effectively removing treated BHCs from the pre-treatment period). In this way, the sample now 
includes only untreated BHCs for 2012.  We appreciate such an approach may introduce sample bias, but it is the best solution facilitating the use of this technique with 
our data set.    
 
